Masthead by unknown
University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series 
Volume 7 April 1915 Article 4 
1915 
Masthead 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Masthead, 7 Bulletin Law Series. (1915) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/ls/vol7/iss1/4 
This Masthead is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Missouri Bulletin Law Series by an 
authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please 
contact bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
LAW SERIES
Published Four Times a Year by the University of Missouri School of Law
MANLEY 0. HUDSON
Editor-in- Charge
Board of Student Editors
KEEHN BERRY G. LEE DOUTHITT
ROBERT BURNETT LAURANCE M. HYDE
RoY BURNS DEAN H. LEOPARD
LYNN WEBB JULIUS C. SHAPIRO
APRIL NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTEEN
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
BILLS OF LADING-LIABILITY OF BANK WHICH DISCOUNTS DRAFT
WITH BILL OF LADING ATTACHED FOR DEFECT IN GOODS. TAPEE V.
VARLEY-WOLTER Co. '-Transactions between sellers of goods and banks
with reference to drafts drawn on buyers usually take one of three forms:
the bank may discount the draft giving credit to the seller and taking an
indorsement of the bill of lading to the seller's order; under the same
circumstances it may pay cash to the seller; or it may buy the draft and
attached bill of lading outright. In all three cases the bank becomes
owner of the goods by reason of the transfer of the bill of lading which
represents them;2 it occupies a position analogous to that of a mortgagee,
succeeding the seller in that position.' The buyer has a right to the goods
upon paying the draft, the bank merely holding the goods as security for
payment.4 In the third case, the bank by buying the draft and bill of
lading really becomes the assignee of the buyer's contract, and holds title
to the goods as the seller held it after the shipment, simply to secure the
1. (1914) 171 S. W. 19.
2. Cairo Bank v. Crocker (1872) 111 Mass. 163; National Bank v. Bailey (1875)
115 Mass. 228; Forbes v. R. R. (1882) 133 lzass. 154; Farmers' Bank v. Logan (1878)
73 N. Y. 568.
3. Williston, Sales, § 286.
4. Mirabita v. Imperial Bank (1878) 3 Ex. D. 164; First National Bank of Bir-
mingham v. Wilkesbarre Lace Co. (1909) 162 Ala. 309, 50 So. 153; Leonhardt v. Small(1906) 117 Tenn. 153, 96 S. W. 1051.
(40)
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payment of the price. If the buyer has accepted the bill drawn by the
seller, the bank as bona fide purchaser of the bill may assert its rights free
from defenses which might avail against the seller or drawer; until the draft
has been accepted by the drawee, the bank's rights against him depend
entirely on the contract between the seller and buyer.5 As the owner of
the goods, the bank may assert various rights incident to ownership. It
may bring replevin or trover,5 and if the buyer should get possession of
the goods without paying the draft he gets no title and cannot transfer
any, even to a bona fide purchaser without notice.7
The question then arises as to the liability of the bank to the buyer
who has paid the draft, first if there are no goods, i.e., where the bill of
lading is forged; second, where the seller has no title to the goods; and third,
where the goods are defective. If the bill of lading is forged, the bank is
no less a bona fide transferee of the draft for value and without notice.
The drawee becomes absolutely liable on the acceptance of the draft and
cannot recover, notwithstanding a failure of consideration between him
and the seller, nor has the drawee who has paid the draft any remedy
against the bank if the seller had no title to the goods.' Being a bonafide
transferee of the bill of lading, all equities are cut off and the bank is not
liable. The interest acquired by it does not make it a party to the con-
version.
9
The bank is not liable to the drawee of the draft when the goods
represented by the bill of lading are defective in quality or quantity. The
contrary has been held in some jurisdictions. Beginning with the case of
Landa v. Lattin,'° this rule for a time gained support in several states."
But it has now been overruled and repudiated until it is of little conse-
quence.' 2 The three cases l" cited as establishing this proposition rest
5. First National Bank of Detroit v. Burkham (1875) 32 Mich. 328; Young v.
Lehman (1879) 63 Ala. 519; Mason v. Nelson (1908) 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625;
Springs v. Bank (1913) 209 N. Y. 224, 103 N. E. 156.
6. Exchange Bank v. McGraw (1896) 76 Fed. 930; American National Bank v.
Henderson (1899) 123 Ala. 612, 26 So. 498; Coker v. Memphis Bank (1900) 112 Ga.
71, 37 S. E. 122; Sabel v. Planters' Bank (1901) 110 Ky. 299, 61 S. W. 367; Schafers
v. Rhynders (1902) 116 Ia. 472, 89 N. W. 1099; Mather v. Gordon (1904) 77 Conn. 341,
59Al. 424; Walsh v. Bank (1907) 228 Il1. 446, 81 N. E. 1067; Burgess v. R. R. Co.(1913) 176 Mo. A pp. 257, 161 S. W. 858.
7. Marine Bank v. Wright (1871) 48 N. Y. 1; Cairo National Bank v. Crocker(1872) 111 Mass. 163; Emery Sons v. Irving Nat. Bank (1874) 25 Ohio St. 360; Halsey
v. Warden (1881) 25 Kan. 128.
8. Nat. Bank v. Burkham (1875) 32 Mich. 328; Young v. Lehman (1879) 63 Ala.
519; Hoffman v. Nat. City Bank (1870) 12 Wallace 181; Geotz v. Bank of Kansas City
(1887) 119 U. S. 551; American Nat. Bank v. Grain Co. (1896) 69 Ill. App. 268.
9. Leuthold v. Fairchild (1886) 35 Minn. 99, 27 N. W. 503.
10. (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 46 S. W. 48.
11. Eufaula Grocery Co. v. Missouri Nat. Bank (1898) 118 Ala. 408, 24 So. 389;
Searles v. Grain Co. 80 Miss. 688, 32 So. 287; Sloan v. Carolina R. R. Co. (1900) 126
N. 0. 487, 36 8. E. 21; Mfg. Co. v. Tierney (1903) 133 N. C. 636, 45 S. E. 1026.
12. Mason v. Nelson (1908) 148 N. C. 492, 62 S. E. 625, overruling Finch v.
Gregg (1900) 126 N. C. 176, 35 S. E. 251; Tolerton v. Anglo-California Bank (1901)
112 Ia. 706, 84 N. W. 930, disapproving Finch v. Gregg; Blaisdell v. Citizens' Bank
(1903) 96 Tex. 626, 75 S. W. 292, overruling Landa v. Lattin (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App.
246, 46 S. W. 48; Cosmos Cotton Co. v. Bank of Birmingham (1911) Ala. 54 So. 621,
disapproving Landa v. Lattin, and also distinguishing Eufaula Grocery Co. v. Bank
(1898) 18 Ala. 408, 24 So. 389.
13. Landa v. Lattin (1898) 19 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 46 S. W. 48; Finch v. Gregg(1900) 126 N. C. 176, 35 S. E. 251; Haas v. Citizens' Bank (1905) 144 Ala. 562, 39
So. 129.
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upon the theory that the bank in purchasing the draft with bill of lading
attached steps into the shoes of the assignor, thus becoming owner of the
goods and responsible for performance of the shipper's contract. These
cases proceed on the ground that the bank took the draft subject to
the same liabilities existing under the original contract, enjoying no
greater rights and standing charged with the same demands that could
be urged against the vendors. To consider the bank as owner of the
goods and not responsible for delivery, would give effect to only part of
the transaction; since the bank reaped the benefits of the contract it
should be bound by it. These courts say that there is no rule of law or
of public policy against a bank's becoming the absolute owner of a bill
of lading and undertaking to perform an executory contract for the sale
of goods. It is difficult they say, to see how a bank can be the unqualified
owner of the debt, and only a qualified owner of the goods. These theories
as shown above are not sound. One jurisdiction alone now follows this
rule.14 The Mississippi cases on this point rest squarely on Landa v.
Latlin, the whole argument of that case being unqualifiedly accepted.
The case of Exchange Nat. Bank v. Russell,"5 while accepting the rule,
limits it by holding that the bank is not liable for the consignor's failure
to deliver other grain, tho it may have been included in the one contract
of sale.
This doctrine has been generally repudiated. 16 Taking a bill of lading
to secure the draft is not a guarantee of the quantity or quality of the
goods. 7 As before stated, the bank holds the goods as security, and with-
out an express assumption of liability none can exist. It has been held
that the payee of an accepted bill holds the same relation to the
acceptor that the indorsee of a note holds to the maker."8 If this is
true, the acceptor cannot set up against the bank any claim for breach of
warranty made by the shipper. There is no liability on the ground that
the bank has received money which it cannot equitably retain. The
seller could only have collected the price less damages for breach of
warranty. If more is paid to the bank, the acceptor cannot recover the
excess paid. The draft was negotiable, and it is well established that
after the holder of a negotiable draft with bill of lading attached has
14. Miller v. American Nat. Bank (1898) 76 Miss. 84, 23 So. 439; Searles v.
Smith Grain Co. (1902) 80 Miss. 688, 32 So. 287; Exchange Bank v. Russel (1902) 81
Miss. 169, 32 So. 314.
15. (1902) 81 Miss. 169, 32 So. 314.
16. Detroit Bank v. Burkham (1875) 32 Mich. 328; Tolerton v. Anglo-Cal. Bank(1901) 112 Ia. 706, 84 N. W. 930; Blaisdell v. Citizens' Bank (1903) 96 Tex. 626, 75
W. 292; Bank v. Baltimore (1904) 99 Md. 661, 59 At. 134; Leonhardt v. Small(1906) 117 Tenn. 153, 96 S. W. 1051; Guntersville Bank v. Jones Cotton Co. (1908)
156 Ala. 525, 46 So. 971; Mason v. Nelson (1908) 148 N. 0. 492, 62 S. E. 625; Bank v.
Lace Co. (1909) 162 Ala. 309, 50 So. 153; Central Mer. Co. v. Okla. State Bank (1910)
83 Kan. 504, 112 Pac. 114; Hannay v. Trust Co. (1911) 187 Fed. 686. But ef. National
Bank of Boston v. Merchants' Bank (1875) 91 U. S. 92; Trust Co. v. Grotrian (1902) 114
Fed. 433.
17. Robinson v. Reynolds (1841) 2Q. B. 196; Hoffman v. Bank of Milwaukee
1870) 12 Wallace 181; Geotz v. Bank of Kansas City (1887) 119 U. S. 551; Varney v.
unroe County Bank (La., 1907) 44 So. 753.
18. Arpin v. Owens (1885) 140 Mass. 144, 3 N. W. 25.
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secured acceptance of it from the drawee, he is not affected by any equities
originally existing between buyer and seller. The liability of the drawee
to the payee1" becomes fixed.
The minority rule if followed would cause great inconvenience and
would impose great restriction upon business. If the banker had to ex-
amine the contract between seller and buyer to learn its terms and then
examine the cargo to see if it complied with the original contract, there
would be very little business of this kind carried on by banks. To fix
liability on banks in these cases would violate the well settled rules
applicable to commercial paper. It would practically prohibit the present
method by which shippers needing all or part of the purchase money
before the goods reach market, secure the money from the banks. It
would restrict the freedom with which banks now advance money to the
drawers of such drafts, and would as was said in Hall v. Keller2 ° "bring
about a revolution in commercial circles."
There are but three Missouri cases on this point.2 The case of
Columbian National Bank v. White22 seems to be in accord with the minority
rule and has been cited as so holding. 2 In that case the consignee
of lumber discovered after paying the freight that the lumber was of
inferior quality and refused to accept a draft for the purchase price
attached to the bill of lading. The bank which had discounted the
draft sued for the full amount of the draft and was refused relief on the
ground that the consignor's rights had not been impaired or disturbed
by the assignment, and that he had the same defenses against the bank
that he would have had against the consignor. It must be noticed that the
consignee had accepted the draft. Until such acceptance or acknowledg-
ment of his obligation he was bound only by the terms of the original
contract and not until acceptance of the draft does he come under a
different liability. In Burrton State Bank v. Milling Co., 24 a grain com-
pany on the order of a broker shipped corn to the defendant mill, issuing
a draft with bill of lading which it assigned to the plaintiff bank. By
mistake the defendant received the draft and bill of lading, surrendered the
latter to the railroad and got possession of the grain. It remittcd the
amount of the draft to the broker. In a suit by the bank the court held
the defendant still liable to the bank for the amount of the draft, neither
payment to the broker nor defect in the goods being a defense. This case
is in accord with the majority rule.
19. Shafer v. Bronenberg (1873) 42 Ind. 89; Nowak v. Excelsior Stone Co. (1875)
78 Ill. 307; Hayes v. Hathorn (1878) 74 N. Y. 486; Law v. Brinker (1883) 6 Col. 555;
Arpin v. Owens (1885) 140 Mass. 144, 3 N. E. 25; Flourney v. Nat. Bank (1887) 78
Ga. 222, 2 S. E. 547; Tolerton v. Bank (1901) 112 Ia. 706, 84 N. W. 930.
20. (1902) 64 Kan. 211, 67 Pac. 518.
21. Columbian Nat. Bank v. White (1896) 65 Mo. App. 677; Burrton State Bank
v. Milling Co. (1912) 163 Mo. App. 135, 145 S. W. 508; Tapee v. Varley-Wolter Co.
(1914) 171 S. W. 19.
22. (1896) 65 Mo. App. 677.
23. Finch v. Gregg (1900) 126 N. C. 176, 35 S. W. 251; Mason v. Nelson (1904)
148 N. 0. 492, 62 S. W. 625; 49 L. R. A. 679, note.
24. (1912) 163 Mo. App. 135, 145 S. W. 508.
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The latest Missouri case, Tapee v. Varley-Wolter Co., 25 is in line with
the prevailing view. In this case the plaintiff bought a car load of potatoes
from the defendant who drew a draft: for the price. This draft with the
bill of lading was discounted by the Market State Bank. The plaintiff
paid the draft, and on finding the potatoes rotten brought suit against the
Varley-Wolter Co., joining the bank as defendant. The Kansas City Court
of Appeals held the bank not liable. From these three cases it is clear
that Missouri is in accord with the majority rule.
G. L. D.
CONDITIONAL SALES-SELLER'S ELECTION OF REMEDY. TWENTIETH
CENTURY MACHINERY Co. v. EXCELSIOR SPRINGS MINERAL WATER &
BOTTLING Co.l-The term conditional sale is used to describe the trans-
action in which the buyer gets the right to possess and use the goods sold,
but the seller retains title pending the payment of the purchase price.
The buyer in such a transaction acquires a property right in the goods,
subject to the bare legal title reserved in the seller for the purpose of
security only. Upon the buyer's failure to comply with the terms of
sale, the seller may either assert the title reserved by the contract and retake
the property without refunding what he has been paid, 2 or sue the seller
and recover the full amount of the purchase price. 3  Whether these
remedies are alternative or cumulative is a question upon which opinion
is divided.4  A majority of courts of this country, holding that they are
inconsistent, apply the general rule as to election of remedies that the
choice of one remedial right is a bar to a subsequent prosecution of an
inconsistent remedial right.5 An excerpt from a leading Massachusetts
case
6 
well illustrates the reasoning adopted by these courts. "They
[the vendors] could not treat the transaction as a valid sale and an invalid
one at the same time. If they reclaimed their property, it must be on
the ground that they elected to treat the transaction as no sale. If they
brought an action for the price, they would thereby affirm it as a sale.
Two inconsistent courses being open to them, they must elect which they
25. (1914) 171 S. W. 19.
1. (1915) 171 S. W. 944.
2. This is the prevailing view. Duke v. Shackleford (1879) 56 Miss. 552; Fleck
v. Warner (1881) 25 Kan. 492; Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk & Bristol Street Ry. Co. (1905)
187 Mass. 500, 73 N. E. 646. But in Missouri, the vendor is required by Revised
Statutes 1909. § 2890, to refund what he has been paid, less a reasonable compensation
for the use.
3. Mechem, Sales, § 615.
4. See 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 144, for an elaborate collection of cases upon this
point.
5. Bailey v. lervey (1883) 135 Mass. 172; Merchants & P. Bank v. Thomas (1887)
69 Tex. 237, 6 S. W. 565; Truax v. Parvis (1886) 7 Houst. (Del.) 330, 32 Atl. 227;
Button v. Trader (1889) 75 Mich. 295, 42 N. W. 834; Crompton v. Beach (1892) 62
Conn. 25, 25 Atl. 446; Parke & L. Co. v. White River Lumber Co. (1894) 101 Cal. 37,
35 Pac. 442; Seanor v. McLaughlin (1895) 165 Pa. 150, 30 Al. 717: Richards v. Schrei-
ber (1896) 98 Iowa 422, 67 N. W. 569; D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Walther (1902) 12 Okla.
20.69 Pac. 953; Alden v. Dyer & Bro. (1904) 92 Minn. 134, 99 N. W. 784; Dowagiac
Mfg. Co. v. Mahon (1904) 13 N. D. 516, 101. N. W. 903; Butler v. Dodson (1906) 78 Ark.
569, 94 S. W. 703; Ellwood State Bank v. Mock (1907) 40 Ind. App. 685, 82 N. E. 1003.
6. Bailey v. Hervey (1883) 135 Mass. 172.
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would pursue, and, electing one, they are debarred from the other." On
principle, the soundness of these views may be questioned. The seller,
holding a title for the purpose of security only, is in substantially the same
position as a mortgagee7 and should have the same right that the mortgagee
has to sue for the price and also foreclose upon the property, his recovery,
of course, being limited to the satisfaction of his claim. The assertion
of both rights does not involve both an affirmance and a disaffirmance of
the sale. An action to reclaim the property is an assertion by the seller
of his security title, and not a denial of the interest acquired by the buyer
These views have been adopted by a respectable number of courts, and
are supported by Professor Williston.5  Some courts, while not recog-
nizing a suit and judgment for the price as an election, do give the suit
such an effect when accompanied by some unequivocal act of the vendor,
recognizing the property as belonging to the vendee, such as attaching 10
or attempting to establish a materialman's lien" upon the property.
In Missouri, there have been no cases deciding squarely whether or
not a conditional vendor, by suing for the price, waives the right to recover
the property. In Kingsland Ferguson Mfg. Co. v. Culp, 12 the seller had
sued and obtained judgment upon notes representing the purchase price,
it having been expressly stipulated that title should not pass till the
property was fully paid for. The judgment remained unsatisfied and the
seller was then allowed to retake the property. The court did not ex-
pressly decide whether an election had been made, though the point
seems to have been raised by counsel. This case seems to be the nearest
approach made by the Missouri courts to a direct adjudication upon the
consistency of the rights of the conditional vendor. Other cases of an
analogous character will be noticed later.
Assuming the inconsistency of the rights of the conditional vendor
to sue for the price and to retake the property, the question arises as to
how far the prosecution of the suit for the price must be carried in order
to constitute a binding election. May the vendor after choosing one
remedy, abandon it and resort to the other? In Orcutt v. Rickenbrodt,"
it was held that the vendor made an election when the action for the price
was commenced, and that though he discontinued that action, he was
estopped to assert the right given by the contract to retake the property.
7. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Baskett (1902) 98 Mo. App. 53, 63, 71 S. W.1113;
Chicago Railway Equipment Co. v. Merchants Bank (1889) 136 U. S. 268, 283.
8. Root v. Lord (1851) 23 Vt. 568; Vaughn v. Hopson (1874) 10 Bush (Ky.) 337;
McPherson v. Acme Lumber Co. (1893) 70 Miss. 649, 12 So. 857; Cam pbell Printing
Press & Mfg. Co. v. Rockaway Pub. Co. (1894) 56 N. J. L. 676, 29 Atl. 681; Forbes
Piano Co. v. Wilson (1905) 144 Ala. 586, 39 So. 645.
9. Williston, Sales, § 571.
10. Heller v. Elliott (1882) 44 N. J. L. 467; Tanner Engine Co. v. Hall (1890)
89 Ala. 628, 7 So. 187.
11. Hickman v. Richburg (1899) 122 Ala. 638, 26 So. 136.
12. (1885).85 Mo. 548. The questions chiefly considered In this case were the
validity of the condition as against a subvendee and the waiver of the vendor's right
by laches. The fact that the seller was tacitly allowed to resort to both remedies Is
probably little indication that this is or will become the Missouri rule.
13. (1899) 42 App. Div. 238, 59 N. Y. Supp. 1008.
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The elements of an estoppel in pais, however, also appear here, for the
party in whose favor the estoppel was asserted was a subvendee who had
paid full value for the property after the commencement and before the
discontinuance of the action for the price, and this circumstance clearly
influenced, if it did not control, the decision of the court. In Frisch v.
Wells, the conditional vendor brought replevin for the property after
he had brought suit for the price and had had the buyer arrested and his
body held, but had not prosecuted the suit. The court held that "it is
not the judgment which may be obtained, but the commencement of a suit
to enforce a co-existing inconsistent remedy in a court having jurisdiction,
which constitutes the decisive act and makes the election binding."
Numerous cases may be found, the language of which seems to support
the same rule, but in many of these either the exact point was not presented
or there appeared additional facts which diminish their force as authority
for the bare proposition that one remedy cannot, even before judgment,
be abandoned for another. On the other hand, it was held in Matthews v.
Lucia,"5 that the conditional vendor by suing for the price and attaching
the property had not estopped himself to reclaim the property where
a non-suit had been taken in the first action. The same result was reached
in Goldenberger Iron Co. v. Cincinnati Iron & Steel Co.,'" where it was held
that a prosecution of the action to judgment was necessary to constitute
an election.
In the recent case of Twentieth Century Machinery Co. v. Excelsior
Springs Mineral Water & Bottling Co., a sale of personal property was
made under such circumstances as, in the opinion of the court, constituted
a conditional sale. The vendor filed suit for the purchase price against
the defendant, a subvendee, and then, being compelled to take a non-
suit, dismissed the proceeding and commenced an action to recover the
value of the goods. The court held that as the title was reserved in the
vendor for the purpose of security, the mere assertion in court of a claim
to the price, abandoned before prosecution to judgment, did not amount
to a conclusive election to affirm the sale and pass title to the vendee, it
appearing that the defendant suffered no impairment of any right by
reason of the abandoned proceeding. Previous Missouri cases especially
Anchor Milling Co. v. Walsh17 and Johnson-Brinkman Co. v. Central
Bank,"5 cited and quoted extensively in the principal case, seem to afford
ample justification for the position of the court. While neither of the
two cases just mentioned involved a conditional sale, the first is quite
similar to the principal case in that the plaintiff, deriving his claim of
title as the holder of a bill of sale in the nature of a mortgage and as the
assignee of a mortgage, held a security title as does the conditional vendor.
14. (1909) 200 Mass. 429, 86 N. E. 775.
15. (1883) 55 Vt. 308.
16. (1913) 153 Ky. 20, 154 S. W. 374.
17. (1885) 20 Mo. App. 107.
18. (1893) 116 Mo. 559, 22 S. W. 813.
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The court there held that the bringing of an attachment suit, which was
abandoned before judgment, did not bar a subsequent recovery of the
-goods in specie; that to constitute a binding election in such a case there
must arise either an estoppel by record, as by judgment, or an estoppel
in pais, founded upon a detriment which the plaintiff would suffer from
the plaintiff's change of remedy. The same doctrine was applied in
Johnson-Brinkman Co. v. Central Bank, where the vendee in a cash sale
paid with a worthless check.' 9
The result reached in the principal case seems desirable and proper.
As the nature of the conditional seller's remedies, that is, whether alterna-
tive or cumulative, may be regarded as an open question in Missouri, the
court might well have decided that even the prosecution to judgment of
the action for the price would not have constituted an election. But if
the majority view to the contrary be taken for granted, it seems proper
to hold, as did the court, that the mere institution of proceedings did not
constitute a conclusive election. This conclusion, it is believed, has the
support of the best reasoned American cases. The question has often
arisen in other than conditional sales cases, and the decisions have been so
conflicting and so dependent upon the nature of the remedies between
which the choice is exercised that it would be hazardous to state any one
view as representing the weight of authority. 20 But there seems to be
no good reason why a vendor, who retains title for the express purpose of
securing the price, should be held to have irrevocably waived the security
and affirmed the sale merely because he has attempted to enforce payment
without resorting to the security, where a change of remedy would work
no injustice. D. H. L.
IMPLICATION OF EASEMENTS. JABLONSKY V. WUSSLER. 1-- The
question of implying an easement usually arises upon the severance of
a tenement into two or more parts. So long as the whole is owned by the
same person there can be no easement over one part in favor of any other
part.' Where the owner conveys to another a portion of his land to which
the only way of ingress and egress is over the remaining land of the grantor
19. The following authorities also hold that the previous action, dismissed beforejudgment, does not constitute an election. Johnson-Brinkman Co. v. Mo. Pac. Ry.
Co. (1894) 126 Mo. 344, 28 S. W. 870 (reversing decision of Kansas City Court of
Appeals in 52 Mo. App. 407-vendor in cash sale paid with bad check; brought attach-
ment suit against vendee, then replevied in hands of carrier); Steinbach v. Murphy(1910) 143 Mo. App. 537, 128 S. W. 207 (excluded partner sues at once for accounting;
later brings another action); Otto v. Young (1910) 227 Mo. 193, 127 S. W. 9 (suit for
damages brought and dismissed after suit for specific performance filed). But the
remedies cannot be pursued concurrently. Lapp v. Ryan (1886) 23 Mo. App. 436(vendor sued fraudulent vendee for price; also replevied goods); Hargadine-McKittrick
D. G. Co. v. Warden (1899) 151 Mo. 578, 52 S. W. 593 (during pendency of replevin
suit, vendor presents claim to vendee's assignee in bankruptcy).
20. See 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 309, for a classification and collection of decisions
relating to election of remedies in other than conditional sale cases.
1. (1914) 171 S. W. 641.
2. Oliver v. Hook (1887) 47 Md. 301; Wheeldon v. Burrows (1879) 12 Ch. Div. 31;
Brown v. Alabaster (1887) 37 Ch. Div. 490; Howell v. Estes (1888) 71 Tex. 690, 12 S.
W. 62.
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or land of a stranger, the law implies a grant of a way over the remaining
land of the grantor.' It is a way of necessity. The courts equally imply
a reservation of a similar way where the land retained by the grantor can
only be reached over the land granted or over land of a stranger. 4 The
way is given under an implied grant in favor of the grantee and under an
implied reservation in favor of the grantor. It will not be implied where
there is another way by which the owner may gain access even though an
implied one over the land retained or granted would be more convenient. 5
The way must be necessary. Where there is no other way but one could
be constructed, the expense of which would be entirely disproportionate to
the value of the land, many courts say there is necessity sufficient for a
way of necessity. 6 Other courts insist that there be strict necessity.
7
All courts agree that a way of necessity cannot arise from mere considera-
tions of convenience.8 A mode of access over navigable water will defeat
a way over land of the grantor which encloses it on other sides.9 The way
being given on the theory of an implied grant or an implied reservation
should be necessary to the use of the land in the condition it was in at the
time of the severance. Such is the rule in England,10 but the cases in this
country seem to be divided. 1 A way of necessity is not a particular
way," but a reasonably convenient way to be selected by the owner of
the servient tenement. If he fails or refuses to select it, the owner of the
dominant tenement may select a way not unreasonably inconvenient to
3. Cooper v. Maupin (1840) 6 Mo. 624; Snyder v. Warford & Thomas (1848)
11 Mo. 513; Vossen v. Dautel (1893) 116 Mo. 379, 22 8. W. 734; Rice v. Wade (1908) 131
Mo. App. 338, 111 S. W. 594 (semble); Clarke v. Cogge (1607) Cro. Jac. 170; Bass v.
Edwards (1879) 126 Mass. 445; Kripp v. Curtis (1886) 71 Cal. 62, 11 Pac. 879; Mead
v. Anderson (1888) 40 Kan. 203, 19 Pac. 708; Pleas v. Thomas (1897) 75 Miss. 495, 22
So. 820; Estep v. Hammons (1898) 104 Ky. 144, 46 S. W. 715.
4. Cooper v. Maupin (1840) 6 Mo. 624; Snyder v. Warford & Thomas (1848) 11
Mo. 513: Clark v. Cogge, (1607) Cro. Jac. 170: Collins v. Prentice, (1843) 15
Conn. 38; Fritz v. Tompkins (1896) 41 N. Y. Supp. 985; Meredith v. Frank (1897) 56
Ohio St. 479, 47 N. E. 656; 8 L. R. A. 58, note; 17 L. R. A. N. S. 1019.
5. Rice v. Wade (1908) 131 Mo. App. 338, 111 S. W. 594: Ogden v. Grove (1861)38
Pa. St. 487; Charleston & W. C. Ry. Co. v. Fleming (1903) 118 Ga. 699, 45 S. E. 664;
Garvis v. Lunsford (1904) 120 Ga. 370, 47 S. E. 967; O'Brien v. Murphy (1905) 189
Mass. 353, 75 N. E. 700.
6. Pettingill v. Porter (1864) 8 Allen (Mass.) 1; Schmidt v. Quinn (184) 136
Mass. 575; Smith v. Griffin (1890) 14 Colo. 429, 23 Pac. 905; Trump v. McDonnell
(1898) 120 Ala. 200, 24 So. 353 (semble); Gaines v. Lunsford (1904) 120 Ga. 370, 47
S. E. 967 (semble).
7. Ogden v. Grove (1861) 38 Pa. 487; Stevens v. Orr (1879) 69 Me. 323; Kripp v.
Curtis (1886) 71 Cal. 62, 11 Pac. 879; Corea v. Higuera (1908) 153 Cal. 451, 95 Pac.
882.
8. Cooper v. Maupin (1840) 6 Mo. 624; Voosen v. Dautel (1893) 116 Mo. 379.
22 S. W. 734; Field v. Mark (1894) 125 Mo. 502, 515, 28 S. W. 1004; Petersv. Worth
(1901) 164 Mo. 431, 64 S. W. 490: Nichols v. Luce (1834) 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102:
Carey v. Rae (1881) 58 Cal. 159; Trump v. McDonnell (1898) 120 Ala. 200,34 So. 353.
9. Lawton v. Rivers (1823) 2 M'Cord (S. C.) 445; Kingsley v. Goldsboro Land
Imp. Co. (1894) 86 Me. 279, 29 Atl. 1074; Hildreth v. Googins (1898) 91 Me. 227, 39
Atl. 550; Staples v. Cornwall (1906) 114 App. Div. 596, 99 N. Y. Supp. 1009.
10. Corporation of London v. Riggs (1880) 13 Ch. Div. 798. Cf. Camp v. Whit-
man (1893) 51 N. J. Eq. 467, 26 Atl. 917, holding that the way of necessity is for the
use of the premises contemplated by the parties at the time of the grant.
11. Feofees of, etc., School of Ipswich v. Proprietors of, etc., Pasture (1899) 174
Mass. 572, 54 N. E. 462; Camp v. Whitman (1893) 51 N. J. Eq. 467, 26 Atl. 917.
Contra: Meyers v. Dunn (1881) 49 Conn. 71; Whittier v. Winkley (1882) 62 N. H.
338.
12. Bass v. Edwards (1879) 126 Mass. 445; Brown v. Alabaster (1887) 37 Ch. Div.
490.
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the owner of the servient tenement. 13 The way being created because of
necessity is held to cease when the necessity no longer exists. 14 Easements
of necessity are not limited to ways but have been extended to include
other easements.
15
Another class of implied easements is represented by Richards v.
Rose.' The easements there were reciprocal. Plaintiff's and defendant's
houses adjoined each other and were dependent upon each other for
support. Both were built by and had belonged to the same person, and
it did not appear which was granted first by him. The court said "that
where houses have been erected in common by the same owner upon a
plot of ground, and therefore necessarily requiring mutual support, there
is, either by a presumed grant or by a presumed reservation, a right to
such mutual support; so that the owner who sells one of such houses, as
against himself, grants such rights, and on his own part also reserves the
right; and consequently the same mutual dependence of one house upon
its neighbors still remains." The principle of this case was recognized
and approved in Wheeldon v. Burrows17 and represents the English rule.
The question has frequently arisen in cases of easements of support but
the court in Wheeldon v. Burrows in explaining Pyer v. Carter,'8 which was
a case involving drains, suggested that the easements there were perhaps
reciprocal. While recognizing that the case was not decided on that
ground, Thesigler, L. J., in Wheeldon v. Burrows said, "I cannot see that
there is anything unreasonable in supposing that in such a case, where
the defendant under his grant is to take this easement, which had been
enjoyed during the unity of ownership, of pouring his water upon the
grantor's land, he should also be held to take it subject to the reciprocal
and mutual easement by which that very same water was carried into the
drain on that land and then back through the land of the person from
whose land it came."' 19  There seems no objection to this if both ease-
ments can be said to be drains. Reciprocity implies equality; the ease-
ments, then, should be of the same kind. Such was the case in Richards
v. Rose, where the easements were both easements of support.
The question has arisen several times in American jurisdictions but
it is seldom discussed as a matter of reciprocal easements.2" In Mitchell
v. Seipel,"1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland very correctly stated the
13. Chase v. Hall (1890) 41 Mo. App. 15; Holmes v. Seely (1838) 19 Wend. (N.
Y.) 507; Bass v. Edwards (1879) 126 Mass. 445; Kripp v. Curtis (1886) 71 Cal. 62, 11
Pac. 879; Ritchey v. Welch (1898) 149 Ind. 214, 48 N. E. 1041.
14. Collins v. Prentice (1842) 15 Conn. 39; Viall v. Carpenter (1859) 14 Gray(Mass.) 136.
15. Racky v. Sprague (1840) 17 Me. 281; 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 713.
16. (1853) 9 Ex. 218.
17. (1879) 12 Ch. Dlv. 31.
18. (1857) 1 H. & N. 916.
19. (1879) 12 Ch. Dlv. 59.
20. Eno v. De Vecchio (1854) 4 Duer (N. Y.) 53, (1856) 6 Duer 17; Jordan v.
Otis (1854) 38 Me. 429; Webster v. Stearns (1856) 5 Duer 553; Morrison v. King
(1871) 62 Ill. 30.
21. (1879) 53 Md. 251.
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doctrine of Richards v. Rose. In Marshall v. Adams,2 2 land was conveyed
and described by metes and bounds. The line passed through a barn.
The grantee removed the portion of the barn on his own land. The
Massachussets court allowed the grantor to recover for the loss of support
and shelter. The court recognized it to be a case of implied reciprocal
easements of support, which are reserved in favor of the grantor as well
as granted to the grantee. The court included the right of shelter as
incidental to the right of support. in Tunstall v. Christian,23 the Supreme
Court of Virginia added a very proper qualification to the rule as already
stated. An owner of two adjoining lots built light wooden buildings on
each. He conveyed one and then the other. The second grantee erected
a large brick building on his lot. The first grantee then began to excavate
on his lot. The excavation would not have hurt the second grantee's
property, but for his having increased the weight of the building on his
land. The court recognized that reciprocal easements may be impliedly
reserved in favor of the grantor but limited it to reciprocal easements in
favor of the land in the condition it was in at the time of the grant. This
is a reasonable qualification and would perhaps be recognized in any
jurisdiction which recognizes reciprocal easements. 24 In order to have
reciprocal easements in a wall, a portion of the wall must rest on the land
of each party.2 5 If it were otherwise, the entire burden would be on one
tenement with no reciprocal benefit at the expense of the other tenement.
As to easements of necessity and reciprocal easements it is immaterial
whether the dominant or the servient tenement is conveyed first. The
courts will imply a reservation in favor of the grantor as well as a grant to
the grantee. With regard to all other easements which are implied, the
courts generally distinguish between cases of implied grants and implied
reservations. An implied grant arises where the quasi-dominant tenement
is conveyed before the quasi-servient tenement and where the quasi-
dominant and quasi-servient tenements are conveyed simultaneously.
26
In such cases there is no question of the grantor's derogation from his own
grant. The question is as to what passes to the grantee under the grant,
and the grant will be construed in favor of the grantee. The courts
uniformly hold that in favor of the grantee something more than easements
of necessity and reciprocal easements will be implied. The English
courts have held that in favor of the grantee there will be implied all those
quasi-easements which are continuous, apparent, and necessary to a
reasonable enjoyment of the premises. 27 While it is admitted that the
22. (1885) 138 Mass. 228.
23. (1885) 80 Va. 1.
24. See Union Lighterage Co. v. London Graving Dock Co. (1902) 2 Oh. Div.
557, 567.
25. Cherry v. Brizzolara (1909) 89 Ark. 309, 116 S. W. 668.
26. Rogers v. Sinsheimer (1873) 50 N. Y. 646; Allen v. Taylor (1880) 16 Ch.
Dlv. 47; Russel v. Watts (1883) 25 Ch. Div. 559, 573: Howell v. Estes (1888) 71 Tex.
690, 12 S. W. 62 (devise); Phillips v. Low (1892) 1 Ch. Div. 47 (devise); Greer v.
Van Meter (1896) 54 N. J. Eq. 270, 33 AtI. 794; Baker v. Rice (1897) 56 Ohio St. 463,
47 N. E. 653.
27. Watts v. Kelson (1870) L. R. 6 Ch. App. 166; Wheeldon v. Burrows (1879)
12 Oh. Div. 31; Brown v. Alabaster (1887) 37 Ch. Div. 490.
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owner of two tenements cannot create an easement over one part in favor
of any other part, it is considered that he may make such permanent
alterations in one part as to adapt it to the use of another part. It is
not unreasonable that the right to require the continuance of such altera-
tions should be held to pass with a grant of the portion in favor of which
the alteration operates. In Polden v. Bastard,2" the court, in holding that
a conveyance of a house did not carry with it the right to take water from
a well on adjoining premises, considered a continuous easement to be one
constantly in use. The case was decided several years before the English
courts had clearly stated the doctrine of continuous and apparent quasi-
easements and perhaps does not represent the views of the English courts
as to continuous quasi-easements. A learned English text-writer considers
a quasi-easement continuous when it involves a permanent alteration
of the quasi-servient tenement. 29  Apparent quasi-easements, within
the meaning of the English rule, are not only those which must necessarily
be seen, but those which may be seen or known on a careful inspection
of the premises by a person ordinarily conversant with the subject.3 0
The general views of the English courts have been adopted by most
courts of this country with only. slight modifications. 31 Pitney, V. C.,
in Toothe v. Bryce32 said that a non-continuous quasi-easement was one
the enjoyment of which depended "upon the actual interference of man
at each time of enjoyment." The same learned Vice-Chancellor in
Larsen v. Peterson33 said "that the word 'continuous' in this connection
means no more than this-that the structure which produces the change
in the tenement shall be of a permanent character, and ready for use
at the pleasure of the owner without making an entry on the servient
tenement." That the structure should amount to a permanent alteration
of the quasi-dominant tenement is perhaps all that is necessary.3 4 Several
American courts, however, have held that a quasi-easement is continuous
when no act of man is necessary for its continous enjoyment.35 The New
Jersey court in Larsen v. Peterson said that what was meant by apparent
was "that the parties should have actual knowledge of the quasi-easement
or knowledge of such facts as would put them on inquiry." It is doubtful
whether actual knowledge by the purchaser of the quasi-dominant tene-
ment should be considered in determining whether a quasi-easement is
apparent within the meaning of the rule. For the benefit of an innocent
28. (1865) L. R. 1 Q. B. 156.
29. Gale, Easements (8th ed.) 115, 116.
30. Pyer v. Carter (1857) 1 H. & N. 916; Gale, Easements (8th ed.) 116.
31. Carbrey v. Willis (1863) 7 Allen (Mass.) 364; Toothe v. Bryce (1892) 50
N. J. Eq. 589, 25 Atl. 182; Larsen v. Peterson (1894) 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atil. 1094;
cases cited in notes 36-41 infra; 8 L. R. A. N. S. 327, note; 26 L. R. A. N. S. 315, note.
32. (1892) 50 N. J. Eq. 589, 25 Atl. 182.
33. (1894) 53 N. J. Eq. 88, 30 Atl. 1094.
34. Phillips v. Phillips (1864) 48 Pa. St. 178; John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co.
v. Patterson (1885) 103 Ind. 582, 2 N. E. 188; Kelly v. Dunning (1887) 43 N. J. Eq.
62, 10 Atl. 276.
35. Providence Tool Co. v. Corliss Steam Engine Co. (1870) 9 R. I. 564, 571;
Borelli Bros. v. Blakemore (1888) 66 Miss. 136; 57 Am. Dec. 760, note; Jones, Ease-
fents, §143. Cf. Lampman v. Milks (1860) 21 N. Y. 505, 515.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
purchaser without actual knowledge from the owner of the quasi-servient
tenement it seems best to require that the quasi-easements to be apparent
be such that they must necessarily be seen or that they may be seen or
known on a careful inspection by a person ordinarily conversant with
the subject.
The decisions are not uniform as to what is necessary in addition to
the requirement that the quasi-easement be continuous and apparent.
In Toothe v. Bryce the court required that it be such as is "beneficial to
and adds to its use and will continue to do so in the future." Other cases
have required that it be necessary "to a convenient enjoyment of the
premises," 3 6 "to a comfortable enjoyment of the premises,",17 "to a
reasonable use of the property granted, ' 38 "to a proper use of the property
granted,".39 "to a beneficial enjoyment of the premises, ' 40 or "reasonably
necessary to a fair enjoyment of the premises." 4' It has been suggested
that because of the uncertainty the whole doctrine of implied easements
might well have been repudiated. 42  Professor Kales considers it based on
the spirit of "officious. kindness." A few jurisdictions have adopted a
fixed test for the determination of the question of necessity, viz., whether
a substitute can be secured by reasonable trouble and expense. 43 In
stating the rule courts sometimes add that the quasi-easement must be
de facto in existence. 44 This, it would seem, is added to emphasize the
idea of permanency involved in the requirement that the quasi-easement
be continuous.
Pyer v. Carter refused to make any distinction between implied
reservations and implied grants. The court said the grantee took the
premises such as they were. Several American jurisdictions have taken
a similar view. 45  They are, however, in the minority. This portion of
the decision in Pyer v. Carter has been repudiated in England, the later
cases refusing to imply a reservation of any easements other than ease-
ments of necessity or reciprocal easements.46 The grantor is not per-
mitted to derogate from his own grant. This is perhaps the prevailing
view in American jurisdictions.4 7
36. Phillips v. Phillips (1864) 48 Pa. St. 178.
37. Fitzpatrick v. Mik (1887) 24 Mo. App. 435.
38. Israel v. Leith (1890) 20 Ont. Rep. 361; Paine v. Chandler (1892) 134 N. Y.
385, 32 N. E. 18; Baker v. Rice (1897) 56 Ohio St. 463.
39. Evans v. Dana (1862) 7 R. I. 306.
40. Kelly v. Dunning (1887) 43 N. J. Eq. 62, 10 Atl. 276.
41. John Hancock Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Patterson (1885) 103 Ind. 582, 2 N. E. 188.
42. 1 Tiffany Real Property, 710; Professor Kales In 3 Illinois Law Review 187.
43. Johnson v. Jordan (1841) 2 Met. (Mass.) 234; Carbrey v. Willis (1863)
7 Allen (Mass.) 364; Randall v. McLaughlin (1865) 10 Allen 366.
44. Johnson v. Jordan (1841) 2 Met. 234; Carbrey v. Willis (1863) 7 Allen 364.
45. Seibert v. Levan (1848) 8 Pa. St. 383; Harwood v. Benton (1860) 32 Vt.
724; Gallaway v. Bonesteel (1886) 65 Wis. 79, 26 N. W. 262; Znamancek v. Jelinek
(1903) 69 Neb. 110, 95 N. W. 28; Powers v. Ilefferman (1908) 233 Ill. 597, 84 N. E. 661.
46. Suffield v. Brown (1863) 4 Do G. J. & S. 185; Wheeldon v. Burrows (1879)
12 Ch. Dlv. 31.
47. Preble v. Reed (1840) 17 Me. 169; Scott v. Bentel (1873) 23 Grattan (Va.) 1;
Mitchell v. Seipel (1879) 53 Md. 251; Wells v. Garbutt (1892) 132 N.Y. 430,30 N.E. 178.
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The question of implication of easements was presented to the
Missouri Supreme Court in the recent case of Jablonsky v. Wussler.
48
The facts were the same as in Bussmeyer v. Jablonsky4 9 and the court
adopted the opinion in that case. A common owner of several lots, on
some of which were buildings, sold five lots to plaintiff. Later the owner
sold to defendant the remainder of the lots. Between buildings on
plaintiff's and defendant's lots was a hallway, entirely on defendant's lot,
which had been used by occupants of both houses as a means of access
to the rear of the lots. Defendant obstructed the passage and plaintiff
sought to compel him to remove the obstruction and to restrain him from
further obstruction. Plaintiff could form a way over an adjoining lot owned
by him. The court treated the question as an implication of a way of
necessity. It did not discriminate between cases of implied grants of ap-
parent and continuous quasi-easements and easements of necessity. Various
cases of each class were discussed. The court said that for creation of an
easement of necessity only reasonable necessity is requisite. Barrett v.
Bell,50 cited in the opinion, involved the question as to whether a kettle
on an adjoining lot would pass under the word "appurtenances" in a lease.
The case did not-directly involve the implication of easements. Field v.
Mark5" was also quoted from. In that case at the time of the grant by
the common owner the property was vacant and perhaps there was no
way apparent at the time of the conveyance. The court did not discuss
apparent and continuous quasi-easements but simply held that con-
venience was not sufficient for the implication of a way of necessity. The
only case in Missouri deciding the question of apparent and continuous
quasi-easements is Fitzpatrick v. Mik.52 The court there said quasi-
easements would be implied where apparent, continuous, "and reason-
ably necessary for enjoyment of the land granted" or "necessary for a
comfortable enjoyment of the thing granted." The passage in the principal
case was apparent and continuous, but the court said it was not reasonably
necessary. With such as a finding of fact the result is perhaps sound;
but it is to be regretted that the principle of the case was not worked out
more clearly. K. B.
OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED BY DEvISE. GALBRAITH V. PENNINGTON.
1
-
A testator devised land to his two foster children, the plaintiff and de-
fendant, in "consideration of their looking after and caring for the wants
of [the testator] and his wife during their life." After the death of the
testator, the plaintiff alone cared for and supported the wife. This suit
was brought after her death to recover half the cost of such support. It
48. (1914) 171 S. W. 641.
49. (1911) 241 Mo. 681, 145 S. W. 772.
50. (1884) 82 Mo. 110.
51. (1894) 125 Mo. 502, 28 S. W. 1004.
52. (1887) 24 Mo. App. 435.
1. (1914) 170 S. W. 668.
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was held that the devise to the foster children was on a condition which
they had a joint obligation to perform and which entitled the plaintiff,
who wholly performed it, to contribution from the defendant. The de-
cision presents two questions: whether the devisees of an estate on a
condition are under a personal obligation to perform that condition, and
whether one such devisee can compel contribution from the other.
Tho devises and gifts on condition that the devisee or donee
support the grantor or some one else be expressed to be "in consideration
of" such support, these provisions are not held to be conditions precedent
to the passing of the title, 2 since the support may be more easily given if
the land can be possessed. Such provisions are generally held to create
charges on the land,' even tho apt words of conditions are used.4 The
disposition of the Missouri courts seems to be to construe these provisions
as conditions subsequent. Weinrich v. Weinrich5 suggests that a condition
for the benefit of a third party may also operate as an enforcible trust in
favor of the beneficiary.
Where a charge on the land is created, the person to be supported
may enforce his claim against the land itself,6 and the devisee or donee
is personally responsible for the support. 7 The devise is construed to be
on a condition precedent that the devisee agree to furnish the support,
and the acceptance alone is sufficient evidence of that agreement.
The provision in question need not necessarily be construed to create
a charge on the land. It may create a strict condition, especially where
appropriate words are used. Such has been the rule of construction that
the Missouri courts have adopted.' Tho in Alexander v. Alexander,9
there were apt words of condition, in Wood v. Ogden'° the court thought
itself bound by that case to construe a devise "upon consideration" to be
upon condition. No personal obligation should flow from a condition. A
condition affects the land, not the person." It acts on the estate granted
as a limitation, and reserves to the grantor a future interest in the land.
2. Wood v. Ogden (1906) 121 Mo. App. 668, 97 S. W. 610.
3. Sheldon v. Purple (1834) 15 Pick. (Mass.) 528; Jennings v. Jennings (1862)
27 Il. 517; Meakin v. Duvall (1875) 43 Md. 372; Emery v. Swasey (1902) 97 Me. 136,
53 AtI. 992; Warner v. Bullen (1905) 123 111. App. 138.
4. Fox v. Phelps (1837) 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 393; Woodward v. Walling (1871) 31
Iowa 533; Isner v. Kelley (1902) 51 W. Va. 82, 41 S. E. 158; Spangler v. Newman (1909)
239 Ill. 616, 88 N. E. 202. But a clear intent to create an estate on condition will be
effectuated. Hogebooni v. Hall (1840) 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 145.
5. (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364.
6. Donnelly v. Edelen (1874) 40 Md. 117; Borst v. Crommie (1879) 19 Hun
(N. Y.) 209. Cf. Murphy v. Carlin (1892) 113 Mo. 112, 20 S. W. 786.
7. Loder v. Halfield (1877) 71 N. Y. 92; Yearly v. Long (1883) 40 Ohio St. 27;
Porter v. Jackson (1884) 95 Ind. 210; Evans v. Foster (1891) 80 Wis. 509, 50 N. W. 410;
Sommers v. Sommers (1901) 69 N. Y. S. 866, 59 App. Div. 340; Wingell v. Bell (1900)
14 Pa. Super. Ct. 558.
8. Messersmith v. Messersmith (1856) 22 Mo. 369; Alexander v. Alexander (1900)
156 Mo. 413, 57 S. W. 110; Wood v. Ogden (1906) 121 Mo. App. 668, 97 S. W. 610.
But cf. Anderson v. Gaines (1900) 156 Mo. 664, 57 S. W. 726, where "under this
express condition and agreement" was construed as a covenant.
9. (1900) 156 Mo. 413, 57 S. W. 110.
10. (1906) 121 Mo. App. 668, 97 S. W. 610.
11. Clark v. Inhabitants of Brookfield (1884) 81 Mo. 503; Conditions Sub-
sequent in Conveyances in Missouri, 5 Law Series, Missouri Bulletin, pp. 16, 17, 18.
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While there may be a duty on the part of the person to whose benefit the
condition runs, to make a demand for the performance of the condition,
12
neither he nor the grantor should be permitted to enforce its performance,
or recover damages for the failure to perform. Dicta in several Missouri
decisions seem to point to a contrary rule. In Baker v. C. R. I. & P. R.
R. 13 and Hubbard v. K. C. etc. R. R.,14 there were grants of rights of way
to railroads upon condition that they do some act on the land for the benefit
of the grantor. The proper remedy for breach of the condition, it was
indicated in each case, was a contractual one, either specific performance
or a suit for damages. The dicta, if taken literally, are clearly opposed
to decided cases in other jurisdictions." In an early New York decision, 16
a condition in a deed that the grantee support the grantor was expressly
held insufficient to show a promissory undertaking on the part of the
grantee. The double operation of the conditional expression suggested
in Weinrich v. Weinrich,1 7 that it act both as a condition and a trust or
charge, is not inconceivable. It has not been adopted, however, in any
decision. On principle, then, it would seem that the provision for support
in the principal case, construed solely as a condition should not have
created any personal obligation.
Proceeding, however, upon the assumption of the court that a
personal obligation did arise in the principal case, the inquiry is still open,
whether that obligation attached jointly as to the whole of the support
to both the devisees, or separately as to one-half of it to each of them.
In the former case, the plaintiff who discharged the entire obligation and
relieved the defendant from his liability, was clearly entitled to con-
tribution. 8 This principle was stated in Jacobsmeyer v. Jacobsmeyer,5
where the plaintiff and defendant jointly executed a contract to take care
of their parents. But if the plaintiff and defendant were each separately
liable for one-half the support, it is difficult to justify the plaintiff's
recovery. One who voluntarily discharges another's obligation to furnish
support without that other's prior request or subsequent approval, is
generally regarded as an officious intermeddler.2 0 It was stated in an
12. Bradstreet v. Clark (1838) 21 Pick (Mass.) 389; Hogeboom v. Hall (1840) 24
Wend. (N. Y.) 145.
13. (1874) 57 Mo. 265.
14. (1876) 63 Mo. 68.
15. Palmer v. Fort Plain & Cooperstown Plank Road Co. (1854) 11 N. Y. 376;
Woodruff v. Trenton Water Power Co. (1856) 10 N. J. Eq. 489; Blanchard v. Detroit,
Lansing & Lake Mich. R. R. Co. (1875) 31 Mich. 42; Close v. Burlington, Cedar
Rapids & Northern Ry. Co. (1884) 64 Iowa 149. But cf. Aiken v. Albany, etc., R. R.
Co. (1857) 26 Barb. (N. Y.) 289.
16. Jackson v. Florence (1819) 16 Johns (N. Y.) 46.
17. (1885) 18 Mo. App. 364. In Hoyt v. Hoyt (1905) 77 Vt. 244, 59 Atl. 845,
the performance of the condition was expressly made a charge on the land.
18. Woodward, Quasi Contracts, § 254.
19. (1901) 88 Mo. App. 102.
20. See Trippensee v. Brown (1903) 104 Mo. App. 628, 78 S. W. 674, where the
general principle is approved; Woodward, Quasi Contracts, § 209; Moody v. Moody
(1837) 14 Me. 307; Savage v. MeCarkle (1889) 17 Or. 42, 21 Pac. 444: Matheny v.
Chester (1911) 141 Ky. 790, 133 S. W. 754. Contra, Forsyth v. Ganson (1830) 5 Wend.
(N. Y.) 558, where the intermeddler who furnished the support was permitted to
recover, on the analogy to the case of necessaries furnished to a wife or infant child
for whom the husband or father neglects or refuses to provide.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
Illinois case,2 1 that a devise to two children "if they should take care of
their mother" imposed a separate burden as to half the support on each
of them. "If it were held," said the court, "that a failure of one of them
to comply, should defeat the devise to them both, great and manifest
injustice might result, such as never could have been designed by the
testator."
It is submitted that when the court once determined in the principal
case that the expression "in consideration of" created but an estate on
condition, it was precluded from considering the question of recovery by
the plaintiff. The condition may have attached as a whole to the devise.
If it did and the defendant refused to contribute to the support, the
plaintiff was compelled to furnish all of it, in order to protect his own
interest in the land. If, on the other hand, it attached in equal parts to
each half of the land, for the failure by the defendant to perform his part,
the heirs of the testator might have entered upon his half of the land for
breach of condition; it is conceivable that the defendant's obligation
was personal in line with Alexander v. Alexander,22 in which case only
performance by him would save a forfeiture.
R. BURNETT
PUBLIC OFFICERS-APPOINTMENT OF MEMBER OF APPOINTING BODY.
STATE EX" EEL. SMITH v. BOWMAN. 1-The cases involving the validity
of appointments to office made from the membership of the body having
appointive power may be classified as follows: first, where the appointee's
participation was necessary to the exercise of the appointive power;
second, where such participation was unnecessary; third, where the
appointee did not participate. Each of these classes will be considered
apart from the statutory and constitutional provisions which in some
jurisdictions make all such appointments void.2
The appointments in the first class of cases are void as against public
policy. 3 Thus, where a statute empowered three justices of the peace to
appoint a supervisor, and the appointee's participation was necessary to
his appointment, the New York court held their action void on the ground
that as the depositaries of a public trust the justices could not perform it
for the benefit of one of their number.4 In Commonwealth v. Douglass,'
the power to appoint a prison inspector was vested by statute in a mayor
21. Jennings v. Jennings (1862) 27 Ill. 517.
22. (1900) 156 Mo. 413, 57 8. W. 110.
1. (1914) 170 S. W. 700.
2. Ellis v. Lennon (1891) 86 Mich. 468, 49 N. W. 308; Doyle v. Board of Educa-
tion (1892) 54 N. J. L. 313, 23 At. 670; Gaw v. Ashley (1907) 195 Mass. 173, 80 N. E.
790.
3. Throop, Public Officers, § 120; Mechem, Public Officers, § 112; Common-
wealth v. Douglass (1803) 1 Binn. (Pa.) 77; People ex rel. Davis v. Thomas (1861) 33
Barb. (N. Y.) 287; Ohio ex rel. Louthan v. Taylor (1861) 12 Ohio St. 130; State ex rel.
Rosenheim v. Hoyt (1867) 2 Oregon 247; State ex tel. Oakey v. Fowler (1895) 66 Conn.
294, 32 Atl. 162 (semble).
4. People ex rel. Davis v. Thomas (1861) 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 287.
5. (1803) 1 Binn. (Pa.) 77.
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two aldermen, and two county justices. The court held that quo warranto
would lie against the appointee whose participation was necessary to his
appointment. This decision was approved in Ohio ex rel. Louthan v.
Taylor,6 where the appointment to the office of superintendent of a county
infirmary of one of the members of the board of directors of such infirmary,
was held void because the duties of the two offices were incompatible. The
appointee's vote was necessary to his appointment. In State ex rel
Rosenheim v. lHoyt,7 a city council was composed of nine members, and
the charter required an appointee to receive at least five votes. The city
ordinance prohibited a member of the council from voting on any question
in which such member was immediately interested. The relator received
five votes, one of which was cast by himself. In holding this appointment
void the court said that "it k contrary to the polcy of the law for an
officer to prostitute his official position by using his official appointing
power to place himself in office." The decision may, however, be placed
upon the ground that the election was in violation of the city ordinance,
but in view of the cases discussed above it would seem that a proper basis
for the decision is the appointee's membership in the appointing body.
The appointments in the second class of cases are also void as against
public policy.8 In Kinyon v. Duchene,' where the board of supervisors
was empowered to select drain commissioners, it was held improper to
select such commissioners from its own membership. The court said,
"whether they voted for their own appointment does not affirmatively
appear, but they had as much right to do so as others had to vote for them."
The court referred to the offices as incompatible, but treated the appoint-
ment as void. If it appears that the appointee was present and voted
against his appointment, it might be urged that he had properly per-
formed his duty to vote, and therefore is entitled to the office. But the
fact that the selection is from the membership of the board having ap-
pointive power seems sufficient to invalidate the appointment. Two
jurisdictions apparently recognize the validity of the appointments in
the second class of cases.'0 In State ex rel. Mueller v. Meyer," a board of
trustees of an incorporated town selected one of its members to succeed
the defendant as a member of the board of school trustees. The relator
resigned the position of town trustee and qualified as school trustee. The
court held this appointment valid. This case may, however, be disting-
uished from the cases representing the other view in that it does not
appear that the office carried with it compensation and duties which were
fixed by the appointing board. It is also characterized by the fact that
6. (1861) 12 Ohio St. 130.
7. (1867) 2 Oregon 247.
8. Kinyon v. Duchene (1870) 21 Mich. 498; Meglemery v. Weissinger (1910) 140
Ky. 353, 131 S. W. 40 (sembhe) Throop, Public Officers, §§ 120, 610-613; Mechem,
Public Officers, § 112; 29 Cyc., 1381.
9. (1870) 21 Mich. 498.
10. State ex rel. Mueller v. Meyer (1878) 60 Ind. 288. See the dictum in State
ex rel. Oakey v. Fowler (1895) 66 Conn. 294, 32 At. 162.
11. (1878) 60 Ind. 288,
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the relator resigned as member of the city board before qualifying as
school trustee. The court distinguished Commonwealth v. Douglass
12
and State ex rel. Louthan v. Taylor,13 as turning upon the question of the
holding of two inconsistent offices by the same person at the same time.
Meglemery v. Weissinger14 is the most recent case of the third class.
A fiscal court appointed one of its own members whose term of office
expired in three days to an office, the duties and salary of which were
fixed by statute. In holding the appointment void the court said, "nor
does the fact that he was not present with the court when his appointment
was made, have the effect of changing this salutary rule." Clearly, under
this rule the appointment would be held void if the appointee was present
but did not participate in the appointment. It would seem that the
basis of the doctrine of the cases is something more than the impropriety
of the appointee's forfeiture of the first position by an acceptance of the
office obtained through an exercise of his official appointing power.
The reasoning of the cases which treat the appointments void because
of the incompatibility of the two offices would seem to be unsound on
principle. The common law rule is well established that one who while
occupying a public office accepts another which is incompatible with it,
ipso facto forfeits the first without judicial proceeding or any further act
of the incumbent.1 5 It is the acceptance of, not the election or appointment
to, an incompatible office which effects a forfeiture of the first office.
16
Where the holding of the two offices is forbidden by the constitution or
the statutes an incompatibility is created similar in effect to that at
common law.' 7 An exception to this rule is made where the officer
cannot vacate the first office by his own act, upon the principle that he
will not be permitted to do indirectly that which he could not do directly.
18
This exception does not prevail in Missouri by virtue of a constitutional
provision 19 which permits a public officer to resign at will."0 Where the
power which is authorized to accept his surrender of the first office appoints
him to the second there is an implied concurrence in the new appointment.
21
The cases involving incompatibility created by common law, the constitu-
tion or the statutes, are to be distinguished from the cases where a person
holding one office is declared ineligible to election to another office. In
the former cases it is the holding of the two offices at the same time which
is forbidden; 22 while in the latter cases the provisions incapacitate the
12. (1803) 1 Binn. (Pa.) 77.
13. (1861) 12 Ohio St. 130.
14. (1910) 140 Ky. 353, 131 S. W. 40.
15. State v. Draper (1870) 45 Mo. 355; State ex rel. Walker v. Bus (1896) 135 Mo.
325, 36 S. W. 636; Rex v. Tizzard (1829) 9 13. & 0. 418; People ex rel. Brown v. Dickson
(1855) 17 111. 191; People ex rel. Kelley v. City of Brooklyn (1879) 77 N. Y. 503; Shell
v. Cousins (1883) 77 Va. 328.
16. State v. Draper (1870) 45 Mo. 355; State ex rel. Walker v. Bus (1896) 135 Mo.
325, 36 S. W. 636.
17. 'State ex rel. Walker v. Bus (1896) 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636.
18. King v. Patteson (1832) 4 B. & Ad. 9.
19. Constitution of 1875, Art. XIV, § 5.
20. State ex rel. Walker v. Bus (1896) 135 Mo. 325, 36 S. W. 636.
21. State ex rel. Kingsbury v. Brinkerhoff (1886) 66 Tex. 45, 17 S. W. 109.
22. See cases cited under note 15.
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incumbent of the first office for election to the second office. Any at-
tempted election thereto is void, and does not effect a forfeiture of the
first office.
23
The officers of a municipal corporation like those of a private corpora-
tion are, to an extent, agents of the corporate body. 24  Wherever an
agent is vested with authority to use any discretion in the exercise of a
power conferred upon him, the law requires this discretion to be used in
good faith for the benefit of the principal. The requirement is the same
where the power is committed to members of a board to be exercised by
them in joint action. 2 Upon this theory the cases hold that municipal
officers can not be interested directly or indirectly in municipal contracts.
In Smith v. City of Albany,26 the council of the city of Albany of which
the plaintiff was a member adopted a resolution, for which the plaintiff
voted, appropriating a sum of money to defray the expense of a celebration.
Under this resolution a committee from the membership of the council was
appointed, under whose employment the plaintiff furnished horses and
carriages to be used in the celebration. A statute made such contracts
unlawful. The court in denying the plaintiff a recovery under a construc-
tion of the statute held that it was "simply declaratory of the law as it
existed previous to its passage." It is immaterial that the transaction is
fair on its face, or that the contractor did not participate in authorizing
the contract.2 7 The city is entitled to his services and judgment in
letting the contract.2 8 However, membership on the municipal board is
not alone sufficient, the basis of the doctrine being the antagonism between
the private interest of the officer and his public duty. 29 Statutes of
Missouri applicable to cities of the first,"° second 8 ' and third classes,3 2
expressly prohibit municipal officers from being interested either directly
or indirectly in municipal contracts.
A similar problem is encountered in answering the question how far
directors may lawfully deal with their corporation. The principles upon
which directors are restricted in dealing with their corporation are similar
to those upon which the appointments and contracts discussed above are
held void. Hence, if a contract is adopted at a meeting where it is neces-
sary to count the interested director to make a quorum33 or to pass the
resolution authorizing the contract,3 4 it may be avoided by the corpora-
23. Crawford v. Dunbar (1877) 52 Cal. 36; In re Corliss (1878) 11 R. I. 638.
24. Capital Gas Co. v. Young (1895) 109 Cal. 140, 41 Pac. 859.
25. Throop. Public Officers, § 610.
26. (1875) 61 N. Y. 444.
27. Berka v. Woodward (1899) 125 Cal. 119, 57 Pac. 777 (semble).
28. 2 Machen. Private Corporations, § 1566.
29. Boggs v. Caldwell Co. (1859) 28 Mo. 586; Niles v. Muzzy (1875) 33 Mich. 61.
30. Revised Statutes, 1909, §§ 8570, 8871.
31. Laws of 1913, p. 460.
32. Laws of 1913, p. 525. This statute applies only to those cities of the third
class which elect to organize under it. Revised Statutes 1909, § 9174.
33. Hillv. Rich Hill CoalMining Co. (1893) 119 Mo. 9, 24S. W. 223.
34. Konkakee Woolen Mills Co. v. Kampe (1889) 38 Mo. App. 229; Davis
Mill Co. v. Bennett (1889) 39 Mo. App. 460; Wardell v. Railroad Co. (1880) 103 U. S.
651.
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tion. This is because the director has a duty to act for the shareholders
rather than for himself. So where the interested director has participated
in the action of the board authorizing the contract but his vote was not
necessary to constitute a sufficient majority, the prevalent doctrine
treats such contracts as voidable even though the utmost good faith is
used.36 But the Missouri cases hold that "contracts thus entered into
are presumptively valid, but when questioned by proceedings in equity,
will be jealously scrutinized and set aside upon any reasonable appearance
of unfairness or fraud."3 6 The majority doctrine regards participation
by the interested director sufficient to render the contract voidable whether
or not his vote was necessary to its authorization. 37 His obligation is
not discharged by a performance of the duty to vote; there is an additional
duty to counsel and advise. However, where the interested director has
not participated in the transaction on behalf of the company and the
contract is fair and honest it is enforceable.3 8 This is upon the theory
that there is not a sufficient conflict of interests to invalidate the trans-
action.
In the recent case of State ex rel. Smith v. Bowman,3 the council of a
city of the third class having the power to select a city clerk, appointed
one of its members to that office. The council consisted of sixteen mem-
bers. The relator received nine votes one of which was cast by himself.
In a proceeding to compel the mayor to approve his bond and issue a
certificate of election, before he had resigned as councilman, the court
denied relief on the ground that the appointment was void. This case
might have been decided on the ground that the statutes vested in the
city council the power and duty to select a city clerk, and that the ordin-
ances of the city which determined the manner of election required a
majority of the members elected to choose a clerk and prohibited an
interested member from voting. Therefore, the relator's election neces-
sitated nine votes and since his vote was necessary to constitute the re-
quired majority his election was void. The validity of these ordinances
was questioned, and the court did not decide whether the appointee's vote
could be counted, but held that the appointment was void in any event as
against public policy.
Numerous reasons are assigned as the basis of this doctrine, such as,
the possibility of forming a combination among the members of a board
for the purpose of creating offices and appointing its members until all the
35. Munson v. Syracuse etc. R. R. Co. (1886) 103 N. Y. 58, 8 N. E. 355; Ravens-
wood S. & G. Ry. Co. v. Woodyard (1889)_46 W. Va. 558,33 S. E. 285. Contra, Tenni-
son v. Patton (1902) 95 Tex. 284, 67 S. W. 92.
36. Chouteau Ins. Co. v. Floyd (1881) 74 Mo. 291; Patrick v. Boonville Gas Light
Co. (1885) 17 Mo. App. 462 (semble). Williams v. Jackson Co. Patrons of Husbandry(1886) 23 Mo. App. 132; Foster v. Belcher's Sugar Refining Co. (1893) 118 Mo. 238,
24 S. W. 63.
37. 2 Machen, Private Corporations, §§ 1566, 1572.
38. Singer v. Salt Lake Copper Mfg. Co. (1898) 17 Utah 143, 53 Pac. 1024;
Ft. Payne Rolling Mill v. Hill (1899) 174 Mass. 224, 54 N. E. 532; Union Trust Co.
of Maryland v. Carter (1905) 139 Fed. 717.
39. (1914) 170 S. W 700.
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
appointive offices are filled by members of the appointing body; and the
possibility of the appointee's affecting his compensation and duties, since
they are usually regulated by the appointing body; and that since the
office may be a lucrative one a member of the appointing body should not
be permitted to become the beneficiary of the appointment. Aside from
the impropriety of such appointments the most convincing reason seems
to be that since public officers are public agents they should avoid the
possibility of a conflict between their private interests and the interests
of the public. The law will not permit one to assume a position which
affords such opportunities for log-rolling. R. BURNS
SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-WARRANTY OF QUALITY. BOSTON
v. ALEXANDER.--The action upon a warranty was in its origin an action
of tort, but the obligation of a warrantor is now conceived to be con-
tractual. 2 Warranties of quality or condition are of two kinds-express
and implied. "The sale of a chattel with any representation or positive
affirmation of its quality and condition made with the intention of being
relied upon, is an express warranty for the breach of which an action will
lie." 3 The tendency of the early law to rely upon the exact form of a
transaction resulted in the requirement of the use of "warrant" or words
of similar import to render the seller liable.4 However, it is now well
settled that no special form of words is necessary to create an express
warranty.
3
The chief conflict in cases involving express warranties centers
around the question as to whether the statement of the seller was a state-
ment of fact or of opinion. It is held that a statement by the seller that
his goods are equal in quality to other well known articles, similar in kind,
is an express warranty.6 Statements that a horse is "sound," ' or "all
right except for a little bump on his ankle," 8 have been held express
warranties. But where a seller, in reply to inquiries concerning the
soundness of an animal, said "I think so," or "if there is anything wrong
with the mule I don't know it,"' ° it is held that he has not warranted.
The basis for such decisions is that the stateme'nts are not such an express
affirmation but that the buyer is left to judge for himself and that they
are not intended and understood as being other than mere expressions
1. (1914) 171 5. W. 582.
2. Williston, Sales, § 197.
3. Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. McDonald (1009) 138 Mo. App. 328, 122 S.W. 5.
4. Chandelor v. Lopus (1772) Cro. Jac. 4.
5. Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. McDonald (1909) 138 Mo. App. 328, 122 S. W.
5; Carter v. Black (1870) 46 Mo. 384: Childs v. Emerson (1906) 117 Mo. App. 671, 93
S. W. 286; Alvin Fruit Assn. v. Hartman (1909) 146 Mo. App. 155, 123 S. W. 957.
6. MurphZ v. Gay (1865) 37 Mo. 535; Strauss v. American Gum Co. (1895) 134
Mo. 114, 114 S. W.73; Wertheimer-Swarts Shoe Co. v. McDonald (1909) 138 Mo. App.
328, 122 S. W. 5.
7. Samuels v. Guin's Estate (1892) 49 Mo. App. 8: Faust v. Koers (1905) 111 Mo.
App. 560, 86 S. W. 278; Riddle v. Webb (1895) 110 Ala. 599, 18 So. 323; Joy v. Bitzer(1889) 77 Iowa 73, 41 N. W. 575.
8. Danforth v. Crookshanks (1897) 68 Mo. App. 311.
9. Lindsay v. Davis (1860) 30 Mo. 406.
10. Anthony v. Potts (1895) 63 Mo. App. 517.
UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI BULLETIN
of opinion. In Matlock v. Meyers" the statement was, "she is a good
mare." It was held that this was merely an expression of opinion and
not a warranty of soundness. A statement regarding the breeding
qualities of animals may 12 or may not 13 be express warranties according
to whether it can be considered "puffing" or a representation of fact.
An express warranty does not cover obvious defects- those which the
buyer must have observed-unless the seller successfully uses art to
prevent their discovery.' 4 This is based on the supposed intention of the
parties.' 5 The same may be said concerning a defect about which the
buyer knows.' 6 But a buyer may protect himself from the consequences
of a known defect. In Branson v. Turner,'7 the vendor of oxen said
concerning a sore upon the neck of one, "that don't hurt him, it is almost
well." It was held that when a seller contracts in regard to an obvious
defect or makes representations upon which the buyer relies he may be
liable for a patent defect.' 8 Inspection or opportunity to inspect does not
in any way affect an express warranty unless the defect is obvious, as
distinguished from patent, in which case it is held the parties did not
intend the defect to be covered. 19
In the early law, there was no implied warranty of quality 20 and the
maxim caveat emptor was rigorously applied. But the modern tendency
is to substitute caveat vendor for caveat emptor. A study of the law of
implied warranty involves an answer to the question, "in what cases is
a warranty implied and in what cases does the old maxim of caveat emptor
still apply?" 21  In Missouri in the sale of goods specified in some other
way than by description of their character, usually an actual sale as
distinguished from an executory contract to sell, 22 there is no implied
warranty against defects discoverable upon ordinary inspection if there
has been an inspection or an opportunity to inspect-caveat emptor
applies. 23 Thus it was said in Moore v. Koger,24 "the maxim of the civil
11. (1877) 64 Mo. 531.
12. Young v. Van Natta (1905) 113 Mo. App. 550, 88 8. W. 123.
13. Bates Co. Bank v. Anderson (1900) 85 Mo. App. 351.
14. Brown v. Weldon (1889) 99 Mo. 564, 13 S. W. 342.
15. Doyle v. Parish (1904) 110 Mo. App. 470, 85 S. W. 646; Branson v. Turner
(1882) 77 Mo. 489; Samuels v. Gun's Estate (1892) 49 Mo. App. 8.
16. Knoepker v. Ahman (1903) 99 Mo. App. 30, 72 S. W. 483.
17. (1882) 77 Mo. 489.
18. In Ragsdale v. Shipp (1899) 108 Ga. 817, 34 8. E. 167, the seller of a mule
said concerning his condition that he had a shipping cold and would "be aliright in
a few days." Reasoning that since neither party could know the consequences of
this condition and that since each knew as much as the other, the court held there was
no express warranty. Branson v. Turner is distinguishable in that the evidence
showed a reliance upon the seller's statement.
19. Woods v. Thompson (1905) 114 Mo. App. 38, 88 S. W. 1126.
20. Stuart v. Wilkins (1778) 1 Doug. 18, 20.
21. Williston, Sales, § 228. The leading case in the early law of implied warranty
is Jones v. Just (1868) L. R. 3 Q. B. 197.
22. In Lee v. Sickles Saddlery Co. (1889) 38 Mo. App. 205, the court said that
"the law governing executory contracts is quite different from that applicable to
executed sales."
23. Thompson v. Botts (1844) 8 Mo. 710; MeCurdy v. McFarland (1847) 10 Mo.
377; Lindsay v. Davis (1860) 30 Mo. 406; Matlock v. Meyers (1877) 64 Mo. 531;
Muhr v. Eagle (1879) 7 Mo. App. 590; Anthony v. Potts (1895) 63 Mo. App. 517;
Doyle v. Parish (1904) 110 Mo. App. 470, 86 S. W. 646; Moore v. Koger (1905) 113 Mo.
App. 423, 87 S. W. 602; Colcord Co. v. Loy-Wilson Co. (1908) 131 Mo. App. 540, 548;
Detjen v. Brewing Co. (1911) 157 Mo. App. 615, 616, 138 S. W. 696.
24. (1905) 113 Mo. App. 423, 87 S. NV. 602.
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law that a sound price implies a sound commodity, though often employed
to aid the implication of an agreement to warrant is not recognized as
a rule of our law, for the reason that it is considered as being too restrictive
of the right everyone has to make the best bargain possible." The
general rule in this country precludes an implied warranty whenever in-
spection or opportunity to inspect is had at the time of the bargain
whether the defect is latent or patent.25 The English rule is otherwise as
to patent defects.2 6  In Missouri, there are dicta to the effect that the
seller is not permitted to take unfair advantage from his superior knowl-
edge,2 7 i.e., that there is an implied warranty against latent defects
known to the seller. In Colcord Co. v. Loy-Wilson Co.,2 8 the court was
inclined to "doubt if the law raises an implied warranty even against
latent defects, when an article is sold on inspection, but refrain from
ruling on this question." In Doyle v. Parish,29 emphasis was put upon
the fact that the defect in the goods sold was easily discoverable upon
inspection. On principle it would seem that there should be an implied
warranty against latent defects if the buyer reasonably relied upon the
seller's judgment and especially if the defect was known to the seller.
"In all executory contracts for the sale of any commodity, when no
opportunity for inspection is offered, there is always an implied warranty
that the article sold will be of merchantable quality and condition; and
if the article was purchased for a particular purpose, and this was known
to the vendor, at the time of making the contract, then the law will annex
to every such contract of sale, the implied condition that the article shall
be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was bought, unless this is
controlled by express stipulation."3  Thus as regards the implied war-
ranty of merchantability it has been held that in a contract for the sale
of ice, 31 flour, 32 corn,3 3 or milk 34 there is an implied warranty that it shall
be fit for general use. It should be noted that merchantability and
fitness for a particular purpose may often be used interchangeably, but a
mower may be merchantable if it will cut grass under ordinary conditions
but fit for a particular purpose only if it will cut grass of a certain height.
As for the second phase of the rule above quoted, it has been followed in
numerous cases, including cases involving straw for horse collars, 35 seed
25. Browning v. McNear (1904) 145 Cal. 272, 78 Pac. 722; Horwich v. Western
Brewing Co. (1900) 95 Ill. App. 162; White v. Oakes (1896) 88 Me. 367, 34 Atl. 175, 32
L. R. A. 592; Barnard v. Kellogg (1871) 10 Wall. 383.
26. Jones v. Bright (1839) 5 Bing. 233; Mody v. Gregson (1868) L. R. 4 Ex. 49.
27. Moore v. Koger (1905) 113 Mo. App. 423, 87 S. W. 602; Samuels v. Guin's
Estate (1892) 49 Mo. App. 8; Carter v. Black (1870) 46 Mo. 384; Matlock v. Meyers
(1877) 64 Mo. 532.
28. (1908) 131 Mo. App. 540, 547.
29. (1905) 110 Mo. App. 470, 85 S. W. 646.
30. Lee v. Sickles Saddlery Co. (1889) 38 Mo. App. 201, 205.
31. St. Louis Union Packing Co. v. Mertens (1910) 150 Mo. App. 583, 131 S. W.
354.
32. Glasgow Milling Co. v. Burgher (1906) 122 Mo. App. 14, 97 S. W. 950.
33. Atkins Bros. Co. v. Southern Grain Co. (1906)119 Mo. App. 119, 95 S. W. 949.
34. Eversole v. Hanna (1914) 171 S. W. 25.
35. Lee v. Sickles Saddlery Co. (1889) 38 Mo. App. 201.
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for sowing,86 a fan for removing dust from a workroom, 3 7 cement for a cer-
tain kind of building, 38 and machines bought for particular uses. 39  But
there is not such an implied warranty if the seller did not know the pur-
pose for which the goods were bought,4" or if an article of certain specifica-
tions or brand is ordered even though it is bought for a particular purpose
known to the seller.4 The reason underlying the rule just stated is that
the buyer has exercised his own judgment instead of relying upon the
seller's. Probably in the sale of second-hand goods there is no implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.4 2 But in Colcord Machine
Co. v. Loy-Wilson Co., 43 the court attached "slight importance to the fact
of the machine being second-hand." In a sale by description such as
"No. 2 white corn," 44 or "fancy apples," 45 there is an implied warranty
that the article delivered shall be of that particular description.4 6  And
in a sale by sample there is a warranty that the quality of the goods deliv-
ered shall equal the sample.
4 7
A refusal to warrant 4 8 or an express warranty upon the same subject
excludes an implied warranty, but the latter does not necessarily exclude
an implied warranty as to matters disconnected with the express war-
ranty.
49
In the recent case of Boston v. Alexander,50 the plaintiff brought suit
for the purchase price of a cow which he had sold to the defendant who
had a few days after the sale returned her. The defendant told the
plaintiff at the opening of the negotiations between the parties that he
was desirous of purchasing a good farm milch cow for the use of his family.
Before buying the cow the buyer's agent asked the seller about "her
milking qualities and if her bag was allright," and the seller said that
"her bag was allright," and "this cow is as straight as a whip as far as
I know." It appeared from the testimony of the plaintiff, who was the
36. Johnson v. Sproull (1892) 50 Mo. App. 121; Cline v. Mock (1910) 150 Mo.
App. 434, 131 S. W. 710.
37. Skinner v. Kerwin Glass Co. (1003) 103 Mo. App. 650, 77 S. W. 1011,
38. Holliwell Cement Co. v. Stewart (1903) 103 Mo. App. 182, 77 S. W. 124.
39. Comings v. Leedy (1893) 114 Mo. 454, 21 S. W. 804; Creasy v. Gray (1901)
88 Mo. App. 454; Ferguson Implement Co. v. Parmer (1908) 128 Mo. App. 300, 107
S. W. 469.
40. Mark v. Williams Cooperage Co. (1907) 204 Mo. 242, 103 S. W. 20.
41. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. v. Baskett (1903) 98 Mo. App. 53, 71 S. W. 1113;
Seitz v. Brewers Refrigerating Co. (1891) 141 U. S. 510.
42. Morris v. Reinstedler (1901) 90 Mo. App. 626; Morley v. Consolidated Mfg.
Co. (1907) 196 Mass. 257, 81 N. E. 993; Wilson v. Lawrence (1885) 149 Mass. 318, 1
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NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
only witness in the case, that he had been informed by her former owner
that the cow had upon several occasions given dark-colored milk after
bruising her bag by jumping fences, and that he, the former owner, had
put a yoke on her, the marks of which were on her at the time of the sale
to the defendant. There was no evidence that the cow exhibited any
breachy propensity or gave bad milk following the sale. It was held
that the lower court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant in that
there was no justification, as a conclusion of law, for holding that the
representations of the plaintiff amounted to a warranty of soundness
and suitability for the purposes for which he knew the cow was being
purchased. The decision is undoubtedly correct because there was no
evidence at all of any breach of warranty granting that there was a
warranty. As a matter of law, it cannot be said that there was an express
warranty because the testimony of the plaintiff did not show whether
the statement was intended and understood by the parties as a warranty
or as a mere matter of opinion. The court also held that there was no
implied warranty of soundness or of suitability for defendant's purpose,
or that the cow was not breachy. The reason assigned was, "It does not
appear from the evidence before us that any of the defects claimed by
defendant were not discoverable upon a reasonable inspection." The
opportunity for inspection which was offered to the defendant at the time
of the sale precluded an implied warranty covering patent defects because
under such circumstances the vendee relies upon his own judgment.
Following the above quotation the court said, "It is not shown that the
defect, if any existed, was not discoverable to an experienced farmer
making a reasonable examination." All sorts of people use milch cows
and it is submitted that an opportunity for inspection should preclude
an implied warranty covering defects discoverable to the ordinary buyer
rather than to an "experienced farmer." The language used was probably
caused by the fact that this particular buyer was a farmer and the point
made does not affect this case. If the proper construction of the language
is that this defect was discoverable to this particular farmer because
discoverable to the ordinary buyer, it is proper. There is a dictum in the
case to the effect that had there been defects not discoverable upon
ordinary inspection and known to the seller, a warranty covering such
defects would have been implied from the plaintiff's knowledge of the use
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